TY - GEN

T1 - Two-stage n-person prisoner's dilemma with social preferences

AU - Takanashi, Seiji

AU - Yokoo, Makoto

PY - 2019/1/1

Y1 - 2019/1/1

N2 - We examine two-stage games where all players choose the parameters of social preferences at the first stage and play the n-person prisoner's dilemma at the second stage with perfect and imperfect information. This model expresses situations where players can choose how much they depend on the other players' payoffs. In this model, we get the following results. If the game has perfect information, cooperation among all players can be attained in an equilibrium by punishing a deviating player. If each player plays the n-person prisoner's dilemma without knowing the choices of the other players at the first stage, cooperation among a constant number of players can be attained in an equilibrium. In addition, we study two-stage games where all players choose how much they are concerned with the social welfare at the first stage and play the n-person prisoner's dilemma at the second stage. We show that when the players are more concerned with the minimum payoff, the number of players who cooperate at the second stage in an equilibrium weakly decreases.

AB - We examine two-stage games where all players choose the parameters of social preferences at the first stage and play the n-person prisoner's dilemma at the second stage with perfect and imperfect information. This model expresses situations where players can choose how much they depend on the other players' payoffs. In this model, we get the following results. If the game has perfect information, cooperation among all players can be attained in an equilibrium by punishing a deviating player. If each player plays the n-person prisoner's dilemma without knowing the choices of the other players at the first stage, cooperation among a constant number of players can be attained in an equilibrium. In addition, we study two-stage games where all players choose how much they are concerned with the social welfare at the first stage and play the n-person prisoner's dilemma at the second stage. We show that when the players are more concerned with the minimum payoff, the number of players who cooperate at the second stage in an equilibrium weakly decreases.

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M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:85077085946

T3 - Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

SP - 2206

EP - 2208

BT - 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019

PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)

T2 - 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019

Y2 - 13 May 2019 through 17 May 2019

ER -