Does copy-resistance enhance cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma?

K. Shigaki, S. Kokubo, J. Tanimoto, A. Hagishima, N. Ikegaya

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿学術誌査読

17 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We propose a novel idea for the so-called pairwise-Fermi process by considering copy-resistance when an agent copies a neighbor's strategy, which implies that the focal agent with relatively affluent payoff vis-à-vis social average might be negative to copy her neighbor's strategy even if her payoff is less than the neighbor's payoff. Simulation results reveal that this idea with a revised strategy adaptation process significantly enhances cooperation for prisoner's dilemma games played on time-constant networks.

本文言語英語
論文番号40008
ジャーナルEPL
98
4
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 5月 2012

!!!All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 物理学および天文学一般

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