Does a resource-storing mechanism favor “the wealthy do not fight”?—An approach from evolutionary game theory

Shinobu Utsumi, Yuichi Tatsukawa, Jun Tanimoto

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿学術誌査読

3 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Motivated by an interdisciplinary question of whether a resource-storing mechanism favors “the wealthy do fight” or “the wealthy do not fight,” we establish a new model based on spatial prisoner's dilemma (SPD) game where a time-accumulating payoff is allowed, and the probability of game participation depending on wealthiness is introduced. Although the model is based on a universal framework, presuming SPDs as a template, the conclusion drawn from the model is interdisciplinary rich. Our simulation results reveal that the common sense (or say, human's philosophical wisdom) of “the wealthy do not fight” helps to emerge a fairly cooperative society depending on the dilemma strength. By contrast, remarkably, it suggests that the common sense of “the wealthy do fight” begets a skewed exploitation society where defectors who exploit poor cooperators prosper. PACS numbers Theory and modeling; computer simulation, 87.15.Aa; Dynamics of evolution, 87.23.Kg.

本文言語英語
論文番号112207
ジャーナルChaos, solitons and fractals
160
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 7月 2022

!!!All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 統計物理学および非線形物理学
  • 数学一般
  • 物理学および天文学一般
  • 応用数学

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