Zero-knowledge protocols for code-based public-key encryption

Rong Hu; Kirill Morozov; Tsuyoshi Takagi

doi:10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2139

Zero-knowledge protocols for code-based public-key encryption

Rong Hu
, Kirill Morozov
, Tsuyoshi Takagi

Laboratory of Mathematical Design for Advanced Cryptography

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Code-based public-key encryption schemes (PKE) are the candidates for post-quantum cryptography, since they are believed to resist the attacks using quantum algorithms. The most famous such schemes are the McEliece encryption and the Niederreiter encryption. In this paper, we present the zero-knowledge (ZK) proof systems for proving statements about data encrypted using these schemes. Specifically, we present a proof of plaintext knowledge for both PKEs, and also a verifiable McEliece PKE. The main ingredients of our constructions are the ZK identification schemes by Stern from Crypto93 and by Jain, Krenn, Pietrzak, and Tentes from Asiacrypt12.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	2139-2151
Number of pages	13
Journal	IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Volume	E98A
Issue number	10
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2139
Publication status	Published - Oct 1 2015

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Signal Processing
Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Applied Mathematics

Access to Document

10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2139

Cite this

@article{76fa79cb344842e8990394b6f75c395a,

title = "Zero-knowledge protocols for code-based public-key encryption",

abstract = "Code-based public-key encryption schemes (PKE) are the candidates for post-quantum cryptography, since they are believed to resist the attacks using quantum algorithms. The most famous such schemes are the McEliece encryption and the Niederreiter encryption. In this paper, we present the zero-knowledge (ZK) proof systems for proving statements about data encrypted using these schemes. Specifically, we present a proof of plaintext knowledge for both PKEs, and also a verifiable McEliece PKE. The main ingredients of our constructions are the ZK identification schemes by Stern from Crypto93 and by Jain, Krenn, Pietrzak, and Tentes from Asiacrypt12.",

author = "Rong Hu and Kirill Morozov and Tsuyoshi Takagi",

note = "Publisher Copyright: Copyright {\textcopyright} 2015 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers.",

year = "2015",

month = oct,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2139",

language = "English",

volume = "E98A",

pages = "2139--2151",

journal = "IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences",

issn = "0916-8508",

publisher = "Maruzen Co., Ltd/Maruzen Kabushikikaisha",

number = "10",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Zero-knowledge protocols for code-based public-key encryption

AU - Hu, Rong

AU - Morozov, Kirill

AU - Takagi, Tsuyoshi

PY - 2015/10/1

Y1 - 2015/10/1

N2 - Code-based public-key encryption schemes (PKE) are the candidates for post-quantum cryptography, since they are believed to resist the attacks using quantum algorithms. The most famous such schemes are the McEliece encryption and the Niederreiter encryption. In this paper, we present the zero-knowledge (ZK) proof systems for proving statements about data encrypted using these schemes. Specifically, we present a proof of plaintext knowledge for both PKEs, and also a verifiable McEliece PKE. The main ingredients of our constructions are the ZK identification schemes by Stern from Crypto93 and by Jain, Krenn, Pietrzak, and Tentes from Asiacrypt12.

AB - Code-based public-key encryption schemes (PKE) are the candidates for post-quantum cryptography, since they are believed to resist the attacks using quantum algorithms. The most famous such schemes are the McEliece encryption and the Niederreiter encryption. In this paper, we present the zero-knowledge (ZK) proof systems for proving statements about data encrypted using these schemes. Specifically, we present a proof of plaintext knowledge for both PKEs, and also a verifiable McEliece PKE. The main ingredients of our constructions are the ZK identification schemes by Stern from Crypto93 and by Jain, Krenn, Pietrzak, and Tentes from Asiacrypt12.

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84942872834

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84942872834#tab=citedBy

U2 - 10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2139

DO - 10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2139

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84942872834

SN - 0916-8508

VL - E98A

SP - 2139

EP - 2151

JO - IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences

JF - IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences

IS - 10

ER -

Zero-knowledge protocols for code-based public-key encryption

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this