TY - GEN
T1 - Unknown agents in friends oriented hedonic games
T2 - 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Annual Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019
AU - Barrot, Nathanaël
AU - Ota, Kazunori
AU - Sakurai, Yuko
AU - Yokoo, Makoto
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - We study hedonic games under friends appreciation, where each agent considers other agents friends, enemies, or unknown agents. Although existing work assumed that unknown agents have no impact on an agent's preference, it may be that her preference depends on the number of unknown agents in her coalition. We extend the existing preference, friends appreciation, by proposing two alternative attitudes toward unknown agents, extraversion and introversion, depending on whether unknown agents have a slightly positive or negative impact on preference. When each agent prefers coalitions with more unknown agents, we show that both core stable outcomes and individually stable outcomes may not exist. We also prove that deciding the existence of the core and the existence of an individual stable coalition structure are respectively NPNP-complete and NP-complete.
AB - We study hedonic games under friends appreciation, where each agent considers other agents friends, enemies, or unknown agents. Although existing work assumed that unknown agents have no impact on an agent's preference, it may be that her preference depends on the number of unknown agents in her coalition. We extend the existing preference, friends appreciation, by proposing two alternative attitudes toward unknown agents, extraversion and introversion, depending on whether unknown agents have a slightly positive or negative impact on preference. When each agent prefers coalitions with more unknown agents, we show that both core stable outcomes and individually stable outcomes may not exist. We also prove that deciding the existence of the core and the existence of an individual stable coalition structure are respectively NPNP-complete and NP-complete.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85077074629
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85077074629#tab=citedBy
U2 - 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011756
DO - 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011756
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85077074629
T3 - 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019
SP - 1756
EP - 1763
BT - 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019
PB - AAAI Press
Y2 - 27 January 2019 through 1 February 2019
ER -