TY - JOUR
T1 - Transfers in international environmental agreements under heterogeneity
AU - Li, Qian
AU - Fujita, Toshiyuki
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science [JP17H01939,JP18K01573]. The authors thank the anonymous reviewers and the editor for their helpful comments.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - This paper analytically compares the effectiveness of internal and external transfers in encouraging participants in international environmental agreements (IEAs). We divide countries into two homogeneous groups: developed and developing countries. Further, we assume that strong asymmetries exist in their abatement benefits and costs. Using the non-cooperative game model of coalition formation, our result shows that both types of transfers can enlarge the size of self-enforcing coalitions, and the external transfers are always preferred.
AB - This paper analytically compares the effectiveness of internal and external transfers in encouraging participants in international environmental agreements (IEAs). We divide countries into two homogeneous groups: developed and developing countries. Further, we assume that strong asymmetries exist in their abatement benefits and costs. Using the non-cooperative game model of coalition formation, our result shows that both types of transfers can enlarge the size of self-enforcing coalitions, and the external transfers are always preferred.
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U2 - 10.1080/00036846.2020.1861209
DO - 10.1080/00036846.2020.1861209
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85107463077
SN - 0003-6846
VL - 53
SP - 3899
EP - 3910
JO - Applied Economics
JF - Applied Economics
IS - 33
ER -