Theory of internet auctions

Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper analyzes the effects of false-name bids on combinatorial auction protocols. If there exists no false-name bid, the generalized Vickrey Auction protocol (GVA) satisfies incentive compatibility, Pareto efficiency, and individual rationality. However, if false-name bids are possible, the GVA, nor any combinatorial auction protocol fails to satisfy these three properties at the same time. We developed a new combinatorial auction protocol called the Leveled Division Set (LDS) protocol that satisfies incentive compatibility and individual rationality, and can achieve the social surplus that is very close to Pareto efficient.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)759-764
Number of pages6
JournalNTT R and D
Issue number10
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2002
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering


Dive into the research topics of 'Theory of internet auctions'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this