The effect of false-name bids in first price auctions

Atsushi Katsuragi, Yuko Sakurai, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper provides a numerical analysis of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in first-price combinatorial auctions, where participants/agents can use false-name bids. False-name bids is ones submitted by a single agent which uses multiple fictitious names, such as multiple e-mail addresses. It is well-known that even the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is influenced by the false-name bids. However, it is not so far investigated how false-name bids affects outcomes of first-price combinatorial auctions, which are widely used in realistic settings. This paper shed a light on the effect of false-name bids in first-price combinatorial auctions, by utilizing Bayesian Nash equilibrium concept via theoretical and numerical analysis.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)199-207
Number of pages9
JournalTransactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2011

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Artificial Intelligence


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