Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits

Naoyuki Kamiyama

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2017.01.001

Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits

Naoyuki Kamiyama

Division of Advanced Mathematics Technology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider strategic problems in college admissions with score-limits introduced by Biró and Kiselgof. We first consider the problem of deciding whether a given applicant can cheat the algorithm of Biró and Kiselgof so that this applicant is assigned to a more preferable college. We prove its polynomial-time solvability. In addition, we consider the situation in which all applicants strategically behave. We prove that a Nash equilibrium always exists, and we can find one in polynomial time.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	105-108
Number of pages	4
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	45
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.01.001
Publication status	Published - Mar 1 2017

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Software
Management Science and Operations Research
Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
Applied Mathematics

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10.1016/j.orl.2017.01.001

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Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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