TY - JOUR
T1 - Stigma model of welfare fraud and non-take-up
T2 - Theory and evidence from OECD panel data
AU - Kurita, Kenichi
AU - Hori, Nobuaki
AU - Katafuchi, Yuya
N1 - Funding Information:
We should like to thank Takakazu Honryo, editor of International Journal of Economic Theory, as well as anonymous reviewers for helpful and important comments. We also appreciate valuable comments from Jun‐ichi Itaya, Keisuke Hattori, Yuji Tamura, and Kimiko Terai. The first author gratefully acknowledges the financial support provided by the Grant‐in‐Aid for Scientific Research from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP19K23194 and JP20K13486).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 International Association for Economic Theory.
PY - 2022/9
Y1 - 2022/9
N2 - This paper attempts to challenge two puzzles in the welfare program. The first puzzle is “non-take-up welfare,” which occurs when needy people do not take up welfare. Second, in some countries, the benefit level is high, but the recipient ratio is low; while the other nations have lower benefit levels but higher recipient ratios. We present a model of welfare stigma in which both non-take-up and welfare fraud exist within the equilibrium. This shows the possibility for the recipient ratio to decrease as the benefit level increases in the comparative statics. Our empirical results are consistent with our theoretical results.
AB - This paper attempts to challenge two puzzles in the welfare program. The first puzzle is “non-take-up welfare,” which occurs when needy people do not take up welfare. Second, in some countries, the benefit level is high, but the recipient ratio is low; while the other nations have lower benefit levels but higher recipient ratios. We present a model of welfare stigma in which both non-take-up and welfare fraud exist within the equilibrium. This shows the possibility for the recipient ratio to decrease as the benefit level increases in the comparative statics. Our empirical results are consistent with our theoretical results.
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U2 - 10.1111/ijet.12295
DO - 10.1111/ijet.12295
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85096657050
SN - 1742-7355
VL - 18
SP - 310
EP - 338
JO - International Journal of Economic Theory
JF - International Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 3
ER -