TY - JOUR
T1 - Social evolution leads to persistent corruption
AU - Lee, Joung Hun
AU - Iwasa, Yoh
AU - Dieckmann, Ulf
AU - Sigmund, Karl
N1 - Funding Information:
J.-H.L. was supported by the Leading Graduate School Program for Decision Science at Kyushu University, funded by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Japan, as well as by a grant from the Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society of the Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST-RISTEX) for the project Future Earth Feasibility Study.
Funding Information:
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. J.-H.L. was supported by the Leading Graduate School Program for Decision Science at Kyushu University, funded by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Japan, as well as by a grant from the Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society of the Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST-RISTEX) for the project Future Earth Feasibility Study.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - Cooperation can be sustained by institutions that punish free-riders. Such institutions, however, tend to be subverted by corruption if they are not closely watched. Monitoring can uphold the enforcement of binding agreements ensuring cooperation, but this usually comes at a price. The temptation to skip monitoring and take the institution’s integrity for granted leads to outbreaks of corruption and the breakdown of cooperation. We model the corresponding mechanism by means of evolutionary game theory, using analytical methods and numerical simulations, and find that it leads to sustained or damped oscillations. The results confirm the view that corruption is endemic and transparency a major factor in reducing it.
AB - Cooperation can be sustained by institutions that punish free-riders. Such institutions, however, tend to be subverted by corruption if they are not closely watched. Monitoring can uphold the enforcement of binding agreements ensuring cooperation, but this usually comes at a price. The temptation to skip monitoring and take the institution’s integrity for granted leads to outbreaks of corruption and the breakdown of cooperation. We model the corresponding mechanism by means of evolutionary game theory, using analytical methods and numerical simulations, and find that it leads to sustained or damped oscillations. The results confirm the view that corruption is endemic and transparency a major factor in reducing it.
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U2 - 10.1073/pnas.1900078116
DO - 10.1073/pnas.1900078116
M3 - Article
C2 - 31196956
AN - SCOPUS:85068250337
SN - 0027-8424
VL - 116
SP - 13276
EP - 13281
JO - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
JF - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
IS - 27
ER -