Security analysis of the SPA-resistant fractional width method

Katsuyuki Okeya, Tsuyoshi Takagi, Camille Vuillaume

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


Elliptic curves offer interesting possibilities for alternative cryptosystems, especially in constrained environments like smartcards. However, cryptographic routines running on such lightweight devices can be attacked with the help of "side channel information"; power consumption, for instance. Elliptic curve cryptosystems are not an exception: if no precaution is taken, power traces can help attackers to reveal secret information stored in tamper-resistant devices. Okeya-Takagi scheme (OT scheme) is an efficient countermeasure against such attacks on elliptic curve cryptosystems, which has the unique feature to allow any size for the precomputed table: depending on how much memory is available, users can flexibly change the table size to fit their needs. Since the nature of OT scheme is different from other side-channel attack countermeasures, it is necessary to deeply investigate its security. In this paper, we present a comprehensive security analysis of OT scheme, and show that based on information leaked by power consumption traces, attackers can slightly enhance standard attacks. Then, we explain how to prevent such information leakage with simple and efficient modifications.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)161-168
Number of pages8
JournalIEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2006
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Signal Processing
  • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics


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