TY - JOUR
T1 - Quality-improving R&D and merger policy in a differentiated duopoly
T2 - Cournot and Bertrand equilibria
AU - Takashima, Nobuyuki
AU - Ouchida, Yasunori
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for his/her helpful comments and suggestions. The authors are also grateful to Moriki Hosoe, Tohru Naito, Akio Kawasaki, Masakazu Maezuru, and the participants of the 55th Annual Meeting of the Japan Section of the RSAI for their constructive comments on earlier versions of this paper. All remaining errors, ofcourse, are our own. This research is partially supported by Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research, No. 16K03627, from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.
Funding Information:
The authors would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for his/her helpful comments and suggestions. The authors are also grateful to Moriki Hosoe, Tohru Naito, Akio Kawasaki, Masakazu Maezuru, and the participants of the 55th Annual Meeting of the Japan Section of the RSAI for their constructive comments on earlier versions of this paper. All remaining errors, ofcourse, are our own. This research is partially supported by Grants‐in‐Aid for Scientific Research, No. 16K03627, from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 The Authors. Managerial and Decision Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
PY - 2020/10/1
Y1 - 2020/10/1
N2 - We combine a model of product research and development (R&D) and technological spillover with the concept of technological distance and examine horizontal mergers in a duopolistic market with R&D. The results are fourfold. First, a merger can better encourage R&D investment than the competition case. Second, with a small degree of product differentiation (PD), the merger criterion under the Cournot duopoly is stricter than that of the Bertrand case. By contrast, with a moderate or large degree of PD, the opposite is true. Third, with a small technological distance, a merger should be allowable. Finally, with a small degree of PD and moderate technological distance, a merger should be allowable.
AB - We combine a model of product research and development (R&D) and technological spillover with the concept of technological distance and examine horizontal mergers in a duopolistic market with R&D. The results are fourfold. First, a merger can better encourage R&D investment than the competition case. Second, with a small degree of product differentiation (PD), the merger criterion under the Cournot duopoly is stricter than that of the Bertrand case. By contrast, with a moderate or large degree of PD, the opposite is true. Third, with a small technological distance, a merger should be allowable. Finally, with a small degree of PD and moderate technological distance, a merger should be allowable.
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U2 - 10.1002/mde.3179
DO - 10.1002/mde.3179
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85087459908
SN - 0143-6570
VL - 41
SP - 1338
EP - 1348
JO - Managerial and Decision Economics
JF - Managerial and Decision Economics
IS - 7
ER -
