TY - GEN
T1 - Pareto efficient strategy-proof school choice mechanism with minimum quotas and initial endowments
AU - Kurata, Ryoji
AU - Hamada, Naoto
AU - Hsu, Chia Ling
AU - Suzuki, Takamasa
AU - Ueda, Suguru
AU - Yokoo, Makoto
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 24220003 and 15K16058.
Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2016, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - This paper develops a strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism for a school choice program called Top Trading Cycles among Representatives with Supplementary Seats (TTCR-SS). We consider a setting where minimum quotas are imposed for each school, i.e., a school is required to be assigned at least a certain number of students to operate, and the obtained matching must respect initial endowments, i.e., each student must be assigned to a school that is at least as good as her initial endowment school. Although minimum quotas are relevant in school choice programs and strategy-proofness is important to many policymakers, few existing mechanisms achieve both of them simultaneously. Furthermore, existing mechanisms require that all students consider all schools acceptable to obtain a feasible matching that respects minimum quotas and cannot guarantee Pareto efficiency. TTCR-SS is based on Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism, while it is significantly extended to handle the supplementary seats of schools while respecting minimum quotas. Our simulation results show TTCR-SS is significantly better than an existing TTC-based mechanism in terms of students' welfare.
AB - This paper develops a strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism for a school choice program called Top Trading Cycles among Representatives with Supplementary Seats (TTCR-SS). We consider a setting where minimum quotas are imposed for each school, i.e., a school is required to be assigned at least a certain number of students to operate, and the obtained matching must respect initial endowments, i.e., each student must be assigned to a school that is at least as good as her initial endowment school. Although minimum quotas are relevant in school choice programs and strategy-proofness is important to many policymakers, few existing mechanisms achieve both of them simultaneously. Furthermore, existing mechanisms require that all students consider all schools acceptable to obtain a feasible matching that respects minimum quotas and cannot guarantee Pareto efficiency. TTCR-SS is based on Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism, while it is significantly extended to handle the supplementary seats of schools while respecting minimum quotas. Our simulation results show TTCR-SS is significantly better than an existing TTC-based mechanism in terms of students' welfare.
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M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85014237462
T3 - Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
SP - 59
EP - 67
BT - AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
T2 - 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016
Y2 - 9 May 2016 through 13 May 2016
ER -