On insecurity of the side channel attack countermeasure using addition-subtraction chains under distinguishability between addition and doubling

Katsuyuki Okeya; Kouichi Sakurai

doi:10.1007/3-540-45450-0_32

On insecurity of the side channel attack countermeasure using addition-subtraction chains under distinguishability between addition and doubling

Katsuyuki Okeya, Kouichi Sakurai

Mathematical Informatics

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

38 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We show that a randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure against side channel attacks is vulnerable to SPA attack, a kind of side channel attack, under distinguishability between addition and doubling. A side channel attackis an attackthat takes advantage of information leaked during execution of a cryptographic procedure. The randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure has been proposed by Oswald-Aigner, and is a random decision inserted into computations. However, its immunity to side channel attacks is still controversial. As for timing attack, a kind of side channel attack, the randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure is also vulnerable. Moreover, compared with other countermeasures against side channel attacks, the randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure, after being improved to prevent side channel attacks, is much slower.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Information Security and Privacy - 7th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2002, Proceedings
Editors	Lynn Batten, Jennifer Seberry
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	420-435
Number of pages	16
ISBN (Print)	3540438610, 9783540438618
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45450-0_32
Publication status	Published - Jan 1 2002
Event	7th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 2002 - Melbourne, Australia Duration: Jul 3 2002 → Jul 5 2002

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	2384
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Other

Other	7th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 2002
Country/Territory	Australia
City	Melbourne
Period	7/3/02 → 7/5/02

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Theoretical Computer Science
Computer Science(all)

Access to Document

10.1007/3-540-45450-0_32

Cite this

Okeya, K., & Sakurai, K. (2002). On insecurity of the side channel attack countermeasure using addition-subtraction chains under distinguishability between addition and doubling. In L. Batten, & J. Seberry (Eds.), Information Security and Privacy - 7th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2002, Proceedings (pp. 420-435). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 2384). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45450-0_32

On insecurity of the side channel attack countermeasure using addition-subtraction chains under distinguishability between addition and doubling. / Okeya, Katsuyuki; Sakurai, Kouichi.
Information Security and Privacy - 7th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2002, Proceedings. ed. / Lynn Batten; Jennifer Seberry. Springer Verlag, 2002. p. 420-435 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 2384).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Okeya, K & Sakurai, K 2002, On insecurity of the side channel attack countermeasure using addition-subtraction chains under distinguishability between addition and doubling. in L Batten & J Seberry (eds), Information Security and Privacy - 7th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2002, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 2384, Springer Verlag, pp. 420-435, 7th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 2002, Melbourne, Australia, 7/3/02. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45450-0_32

Okeya K, Sakurai K. On insecurity of the side channel attack countermeasure using addition-subtraction chains under distinguishability between addition and doubling. In Batten L, Seberry J, editors, Information Security and Privacy - 7th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2002, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2002. p. 420-435. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/3-540-45450-0_32

Okeya, Katsuyuki ; Sakurai, Kouichi. / On insecurity of the side channel attack countermeasure using addition-subtraction chains under distinguishability between addition and doubling. Information Security and Privacy - 7th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2002, Proceedings. editor / Lynn Batten ; Jennifer Seberry. Springer Verlag, 2002. pp. 420-435 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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On insecurity of the side channel attack countermeasure using addition-subtraction chains under distinguishability between addition and doubling

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