TY - CHAP
T1 - Modified power-analysis attacks on XTR and an efficient countermeasure
AU - Han, Dong Guk
AU - Izu, Tetsuya
AU - Lim, Jongin
AU - Sakurai, Kouichi
PY - 2004
Y1 - 2004
N2 - In [HLS04a], Han et al. presented a nice overview of some side channel attacks (SCA), and some classical countermeasures. However, their proposed countermeasures against SCA are so inefficient that the efficiency of XTR with SCA countermeasures is at least 129 times slower than that of XTR without them. Thus they remained the construction of the efficient countermeasures against SCA as an open question. In this paper, we show that XTR can be also attacked by the modified refined power analysis (MRPA) and the modified zero-value attack (MZVA). To show validity of MRPA and MZVA on XTR, we give some numerical data of them. We propose a novel efficient countermeasure (XTR-RSE) against "SCAs": SPA, Data-bit DPA, Address-bit DPA, Doubling attack, MRPA, and MZVA. We show that XTR-RSE itself without other countermeasures is secure against all "SCAs". From our implementation results, if we compare XTR with ECC with countermeasures against "SCAs", we think XTR is as suitable to smart-cards as ECC due to the efficiency of the proposed XTR-RSE.
AB - In [HLS04a], Han et al. presented a nice overview of some side channel attacks (SCA), and some classical countermeasures. However, their proposed countermeasures against SCA are so inefficient that the efficiency of XTR with SCA countermeasures is at least 129 times slower than that of XTR without them. Thus they remained the construction of the efficient countermeasures against SCA as an open question. In this paper, we show that XTR can be also attacked by the modified refined power analysis (MRPA) and the modified zero-value attack (MZVA). To show validity of MRPA and MZVA on XTR, we give some numerical data of them. We propose a novel efficient countermeasure (XTR-RSE) against "SCAs": SPA, Data-bit DPA, Address-bit DPA, Doubling attack, MRPA, and MZVA. We show that XTR-RSE itself without other countermeasures is secure against all "SCAs". From our implementation results, if we compare XTR with ECC with countermeasures against "SCAs", we think XTR is as suitable to smart-cards as ECC due to the efficiency of the proposed XTR-RSE.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33645587537&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=33645587537&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-540-30191-2_24
DO - 10.1007/978-3-540-30191-2_24
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:33645587537
SN - 3540235639
SN - 9783540235637
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 305
EP - 317
BT - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
A2 - Lopez, Javier
A2 - Qing, Sihan
A2 - Okamoto, Eiji
PB - Springer Verlag
ER -