TY - GEN

T1 - Manipulations in two-agent sequential allocation with random sequences

AU - Tominaga, Yuto

AU - Todov, Taiki

AU - Yokoo, Makoto

N1 - Funding Information:
This work was partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grants Number 24220003, 26540118, and 26730005. We thank Haris Aziz, Jérôme Lang, and anonymous referee for their helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are our own.
Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2016, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - Sequential allocation is one of the most fundamental models for allocating indivisible items to agents in a decentralized manner, in which agents sequentially pick their favorite items among the remainder based on a pre-defined priority ordering of agents (a sequence). In recent years, algorithmic issues about agents' manipulations have also been investigated, such as the computational complexity of verifying whether a given bundle of items is achievable and maximizing one's utility under a given additive utility function. In this paper we consider a slightly modified model, where the selection process is divided into rounds, each agent obtains exactly one item in each round, and the sequence per round is determined uniformly at random. It is natural to expect that finding a profitable manipulation is difficult even for the case of two agents, since a manipulator must consider exponentially many possible sequences with respect to the number of rounds due to randomization. To our surprise, however, an optimal manipulation can be computed without any exploration for exponentially decaying utilities. Furthermore, for general additive utilities, although some exploration is required, it can still be done in polynomial time with respect to the number of rounds.

AB - Sequential allocation is one of the most fundamental models for allocating indivisible items to agents in a decentralized manner, in which agents sequentially pick their favorite items among the remainder based on a pre-defined priority ordering of agents (a sequence). In recent years, algorithmic issues about agents' manipulations have also been investigated, such as the computational complexity of verifying whether a given bundle of items is achievable and maximizing one's utility under a given additive utility function. In this paper we consider a slightly modified model, where the selection process is divided into rounds, each agent obtains exactly one item in each round, and the sequence per round is determined uniformly at random. It is natural to expect that finding a profitable manipulation is difficult even for the case of two agents, since a manipulator must consider exponentially many possible sequences with respect to the number of rounds due to randomization. To our surprise, however, an optimal manipulation can be computed without any exploration for exponentially decaying utilities. Furthermore, for general additive utilities, although some exploration is required, it can still be done in polynomial time with respect to the number of rounds.

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M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:85014144012

T3 - Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

SP - 141

EP - 149

BT - AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)

T2 - 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016

Y2 - 9 May 2016 through 13 May 2016

ER -