License scheme: An optimal waste management policy under asymmetric information

Takayoshi Shinkuma, Shunsuke Managi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)


A system requiring a waste management license from an enforcement agency has been introduced in many countries. A license system is usually coupled with fines, a manifest, and a disposal tax. However, these policy devices have not been integrated into an optimal policy. In this paper we derive an optimal waste management policy by using those policy devices. Waste management policies are met with three difficult problems: asymmetric information, the heterogeneity of waste management firms, and non-compliance by waste management firms and waste disposers. The optimal policy in this paper overcomes all three problems.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)143-168
Number of pages26
JournalJournal of Regulatory Economics
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2011
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics


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