TY - GEN
T1 - K-coalitional cooperative games
AU - Skibski, Oskar
AU - Matejczyk, Szymon
AU - Michalak, Tomasz P.
AU - Wooldridge, Michael
AU - Yokoo, Makoto
N1 - Funding Information:
Oskar Skibski and Makoto Yokoo were supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant (24220003). Tomasz Michalak and Michael Wooldridge were supported by the European Research Council under Advanced Grant 291528 ("RACE"). This work was also supported by the Polish National Science Center grant DEC-2013/09/D/ST6/03920.
Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2016, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - In most previous models of coalition structure generation, it is assumed that agents may partition themselves into any coalition structure. In practice, however, there may be physical and organizational constraints that limit the number of co-existing coalitions. In this paper, we introduce k-coalitional games: a type of partition function game especially designed to model such situations. We propose an extension of the Shapley value for these games, and study its axiomatic and computational properties. In particular, we show that, under some conditions, it can be computed in polynomial time given two existing representations of coalitional games with externalities. Finally, we use k-coalitional games to analyse the relative importance of geographical locations in the game of Diplomacy.
AB - In most previous models of coalition structure generation, it is assumed that agents may partition themselves into any coalition structure. In practice, however, there may be physical and organizational constraints that limit the number of co-existing coalitions. In this paper, we introduce k-coalitional games: a type of partition function game especially designed to model such situations. We propose an extension of the Shapley value for these games, and study its axiomatic and computational properties. In particular, we show that, under some conditions, it can be computed in polynomial time given two existing representations of coalitional games with externalities. Finally, we use k-coalitional games to analyse the relative importance of geographical locations in the game of Diplomacy.
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M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85014227901
T3 - Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
SP - 177
EP - 185
BT - AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
T2 - 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016
Y2 - 9 May 2016 through 13 May 2016
ER -