TY - GEN
T1 - Individually rational strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference sets
AU - Guo, Mingyu
AU - Sakurai, Yuko
AU - Todo, Taiki
AU - Yokoo, Makoto
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers 24220003 and 15H02751, and JSPS Program for Advancing Strategic International Networks to Accelerate the Circulation of Talented Researchers.
Publisher Copyright:
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016.
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - We consider a social choice problem where individual rationality is required. The status quo belongs to the outcome space, and the selected alternative must be weakly better than the status quo for everybody. If the mechanism designer has no knowledge of the alternatives, we obtain a negative result: any individually rational (IR) and strategy-proof (SP) mechanism can choose at most one alternative (besides the status quo), regardless of the preferences. To overcome this negative result, we consider a domain where the alternatives have a known structure, i.e., an agent is indifferent between the status quo and a subset of the outcomes. This set is exogenously given and public information. This assumption is natural if the social choice involves the participation of agents. For example, consider a group of people organizing a trip where participation is voluntary. We can assume each agent is indifferent between the trip plans in which she does not participate and the status quo (i.e., no trip). In this setting, we obtain more positive results: we develop a class of mechanisms called Approve and Choose mechanisms, which are IR and SP, and can choose multiple alternatives as well as the status quo.
AB - We consider a social choice problem where individual rationality is required. The status quo belongs to the outcome space, and the selected alternative must be weakly better than the status quo for everybody. If the mechanism designer has no knowledge of the alternatives, we obtain a negative result: any individually rational (IR) and strategy-proof (SP) mechanism can choose at most one alternative (besides the status quo), regardless of the preferences. To overcome this negative result, we consider a domain where the alternatives have a known structure, i.e., an agent is indifferent between the status quo and a subset of the outcomes. This set is exogenously given and public information. This assumption is natural if the social choice involves the participation of agents. For example, consider a group of people organizing a trip where participation is voluntary. We can assume each agent is indifferent between the trip plans in which she does not participate and the status quo (i.e., no trip). In this setting, we obtain more positive results: we develop a class of mechanisms called Approve and Choose mechanisms, which are IR and SP, and can choose multiple alternatives as well as the status quo.
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-44832-9_11
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-44832-9_11
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84984846580
SN - 9783319448312
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 181
EP - 196
BT - Princiles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 19th International Conference, PRIMA 2016, Proceedings
A2 - Baldoni, Matteo
A2 - Hirayama, Katsutoshi
A2 - Torroni, Paolo
A2 - Son, Tran Cao
A2 - Chopra, Amit K.
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 19th International Conference on Princiles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2016
Y2 - 22 August 2016 through 26 August 2016
ER -