Game Theory for Computer Scientist-Mechanism Design (Advanced).

Makoto Yokoo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Yuko Sakurai, Yoshio Okamoto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This tutorial focuses on designing a mechanism that achieves a socially desirable outcome or a goal of the designer that arises from some practical demands, as several advanced topics on mechanism design theory. We first briefly explains the theory of combinatorial auctions via the most well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. Second, as an example that designs a new mechanism for a practical demand, we introduce false-name bids and illustrate how we improve a trivial robust mechanism against false-name bids. Furthermore, we explore models and several theoretical results on mechanisms of a keyword auction and a two-sided matching as other well-known topics of mechanism design theory.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)34-52
Number of pages19
JournalComputer Software
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2013

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software


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