False-name-proof combinatorial auction design via single-minded decomposition

This paper proposes a new approach to building false-name-proof (FNP) combinatorial auctions from those that are FNP only with single-minded bidders, each of whom requires only one particular bundle. Under this approach, a general bidder is decomposed into a set of single-minded bidders, and after the decomposition the price and the allocation are determined by the FNP auctions for single-minded bidders. We first show that the auctions we get with the single-minded decomposition are FNP if those for single-minded bidders satisfy a condition called PIA. We then show that another condition, weaker than PIA, is necessary for the decomposition to build FNP auctions. To close the gap between the two conditions, we have found another sufficient condition weaker than PIA for the decomposition to produce strategy-proof mechanisms. Furthermore, we demonstrate that once we have PIA, the mechanisms created by the decomposition actually satisfy a stronger version of false-name-proofness, called false-name-proofness with withdrawal.