TY - JOUR
T1 - Exploiting a cognitive bias promotes cooperation in social dilemma experiments
AU - Wang, Zhen
AU - Jusup, Marko
AU - Shi, Lei
AU - Lee, Joung Hun
AU - Iwasa, Yoh
AU - Boccaletti, Stefano
N1 - Funding Information:
We are grateful to Prof. Petter Holme, Prof. Xuelong Li, Dr. Yuichi Iwasaki, Dr. Peican Zhu, Dr. Jinzhuo Liu and Dr. Chen Chu for useful discussions and Chen Shen, Yini Geng, Hao Guo, Yongjuan Ma, Danyang Jia and Yuan Li for technical help. We acknowledge support from (i) the Research Grant Programme of Inamori Foundation to M.J., (ii) the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant nos. 31700393 and 11671348) to L.S., (iii) the National 1000 Young Talent Plan (No. W099102), the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (no. G2017KY0001), and China Computer Federation–Tencent Open Fund (No. IAGR20170119) to Z.W. and (iv) the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research B to Y.I. (No. 15H04423).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, The Author(s).
PY - 2018/12/1
Y1 - 2018/12/1
N2 - The decoy effect is a cognitive bias documented in behavioural economics by which the presence of a third, (partly) inferior choice causes a significant shift in people’s preference for other items. Here, we performed an experiment with human volunteers who played a variant of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game in which the standard options of “cooperate” and “defect” are supplemented with a new, decoy option, “reward”. We show that although volunteers rarely chose the decoy option, its availability sparks a significant increase in overall cooperativeness and improves the likelihood of success for cooperative individuals in this game. The presence of the decoy increased willingness of volunteers to cooperate in the first step of each game, leading to subsequent propagation of such willingness by (noisy) tit-for-tat. Our study thus points to decoys as a means to elicit voluntary prosocial action across a spectrum of collective endeavours.
AB - The decoy effect is a cognitive bias documented in behavioural economics by which the presence of a third, (partly) inferior choice causes a significant shift in people’s preference for other items. Here, we performed an experiment with human volunteers who played a variant of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game in which the standard options of “cooperate” and “defect” are supplemented with a new, decoy option, “reward”. We show that although volunteers rarely chose the decoy option, its availability sparks a significant increase in overall cooperativeness and improves the likelihood of success for cooperative individuals in this game. The presence of the decoy increased willingness of volunteers to cooperate in the first step of each game, leading to subsequent propagation of such willingness by (noisy) tit-for-tat. Our study thus points to decoys as a means to elicit voluntary prosocial action across a spectrum of collective endeavours.
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U2 - 10.1038/s41467-018-05259-5
DO - 10.1038/s41467-018-05259-5
M3 - Article
C2 - 30054460
AN - SCOPUS:85050763977
SN - 2041-1723
VL - 9
JO - Nature communications
JF - Nature communications
IS - 1
M1 - 2954
ER -