Evolution of cooperation in reputation system by group-based scheme

Yizhi Ren, Mingchu Li, Yang Xiang, Yongrui Cui, Kouichi Sakurai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)


Reputation systems are very useful in large online communities in which users may frequently have the opportunity to interact with users with whom they have no prior experience. Recently, how to enhance the cooperative behaviors in the reputation system has become to one of the key open issues. Emerging schemes focused on developing efficient reward and punishment mechanisms or capturing the social or economic properties of participants. However, whether this kind of method can work widely or not has been hard to prove until now. Research in evolutionary game theory shows that group selection (or multilevel selection) can favor the cooperative behavior in the finite population. Furthermore, some recent works give fundamental conditions for the evolution of cooperation by group selection. In the paper, we extend the original group selection theory and propose a group-based scheme to enhance cooperation for online reputation systems. Related concepts are defined to capture the social structure and ties among participants in reputation system, e.g., group, assortativity, etc. Also, we use a Fermi distribution function to reflect the bounded rationality of participants and the existence of stochastic factors in evolutionary process. Extended simulations show that our scheme can enhance cooperation and improve the average performance of participants (e.g. payoff) in reputation system.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)171-190
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Supercomputing
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2013

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Information Systems
  • Hardware and Architecture


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