Does a resource-storing mechanism favor “the wealthy do not fight”?—An approach from evolutionary game theory

Shinobu Utsumi, Yuichi Tatsukawa, Jun Tanimoto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Motivated by an interdisciplinary question of whether a resource-storing mechanism favors “the wealthy do fight” or “the wealthy do not fight,” we establish a new model based on spatial prisoner's dilemma (SPD) game where a time-accumulating payoff is allowed, and the probability of game participation depending on wealthiness is introduced. Although the model is based on a universal framework, presuming SPDs as a template, the conclusion drawn from the model is interdisciplinary rich. Our simulation results reveal that the common sense (or say, human's philosophical wisdom) of “the wealthy do not fight” helps to emerge a fairly cooperative society depending on the dilemma strength. By contrast, remarkably, it suggests that the common sense of “the wealthy do fight” begets a skewed exploitation society where defectors who exploit poor cooperators prosper. PACS numbers Theory and modeling; computer simulation, 87.15.Aa; Dynamics of evolution, 87.23.Kg.

Original languageEnglish
Article number112207
JournalChaos, solitons and fractals
Volume160
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2022

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • General Mathematics
  • General Physics and Astronomy
  • Applied Mathematics

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