TY - GEN
T1 - Cryptanalysis of randomized arithmetic codes based on markov model
AU - Zhao, Liang
AU - Nishide, Takashi
AU - Adhikari, Avishek
AU - Rhee, Kyung Hyune
AU - Sakurai, Kouichi
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012.
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - An improvement of arithmetic coding based on Markov model (ACMM) has been proposed in the paper (Duan L.L., Liao X. F., Xiang T., Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation, 2011, 16(6):2554-2562). Though, a methodology to construct the ACMM is proposed in the above mentioned paper, it really lacks the formal definition of the ACMM. In the current paper, we not only investigate the security analysis of the ACMM, but also put forward formal definitions of the ACMM as well as its different security notions. Based on those definitions, a chosen-plaintext attack is proposed to reveal the used pseudorandom bit sequence for the encryption under the condition that the same pseudorandom bit sequence is used to encrypt the different messages. We also show that the ACMM does not have indistinguishable encryptions under the ciphertext-only attack (i.e., does not have indistinguishable encryptions in the presence of an eavesdropper) even if the different pseudorandom bit sequences are used to encrypt the different messages. Moreover, when the ACMM is combined with the randomized arithmetic code (RAC) (Grangetto M., Magli E., Olmo G., IEEE Trans. Multimedia, 2006 8(5):905-917), we also explore the insecurity of this combined encryption scheme. The analysis demonstrates that the ACMM+RAC is also insecure. Finally, the simulated experimental results show the correctness of all the proposed attacks.
AB - An improvement of arithmetic coding based on Markov model (ACMM) has been proposed in the paper (Duan L.L., Liao X. F., Xiang T., Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation, 2011, 16(6):2554-2562). Though, a methodology to construct the ACMM is proposed in the above mentioned paper, it really lacks the formal definition of the ACMM. In the current paper, we not only investigate the security analysis of the ACMM, but also put forward formal definitions of the ACMM as well as its different security notions. Based on those definitions, a chosen-plaintext attack is proposed to reveal the used pseudorandom bit sequence for the encryption under the condition that the same pseudorandom bit sequence is used to encrypt the different messages. We also show that the ACMM does not have indistinguishable encryptions under the ciphertext-only attack (i.e., does not have indistinguishable encryptions in the presence of an eavesdropper) even if the different pseudorandom bit sequences are used to encrypt the different messages. Moreover, when the ACMM is combined with the randomized arithmetic code (RAC) (Grangetto M., Magli E., Olmo G., IEEE Trans. Multimedia, 2006 8(5):905-917), we also explore the insecurity of this combined encryption scheme. The analysis demonstrates that the ACMM+RAC is also insecure. Finally, the simulated experimental results show the correctness of all the proposed attacks.
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M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84868157772
SN - 9783642347030
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 341
EP - 362
BT - Information Security and Cryptology - 7th International Conference, Inscrypt 2011, Revised Selected Papers
A2 - Wu, Chuan-Kun
A2 - Lin, Dongdai
A2 - Yung, Moti
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 7th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, Inscrypt 2011
Y2 - 30 November 2011 through 3 December 2011
ER -