TY - GEN

T1 - Ciphertext-auditable public key encryption

AU - Hada, Satoshi

AU - Sakurai, Kouichi

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - Loss of backup tapes containing personal information (PI) is a potential breach of privacy and encryption is the typical way to prevent the breach. This paper considers an attack scenario where an adversary who encrypts the PI for backup purpose tries to hide the plain PI in a valid-looking ciphertext without being detected. We show that the standard security notion IND-CCA2 does not capture such a scenario. For example, the Cramer-Shoup scheme is vulnerable to such an attack. To capture such a scenario, we define a new notion of "ciphertext-auditability" as a new property of public key encryption schemes (PKESs). It requires that, given a public key and a ciphertext, anyone should be able to verify whether the ciphertext was actually generated using the public key. Also, it requires that, given a public key and a plaintext, no adversary should be able to generate a valid-looking ciphertext so that the verification passes, but nevertheless the plaintext can be recovered from the ciphertext without the corresponding secret key. We propose a general construction of such PKESs based on standard cryptographic primitives in the random oracle model.

AB - Loss of backup tapes containing personal information (PI) is a potential breach of privacy and encryption is the typical way to prevent the breach. This paper considers an attack scenario where an adversary who encrypts the PI for backup purpose tries to hide the plain PI in a valid-looking ciphertext without being detected. We show that the standard security notion IND-CCA2 does not capture such a scenario. For example, the Cramer-Shoup scheme is vulnerable to such an attack. To capture such a scenario, we define a new notion of "ciphertext-auditability" as a new property of public key encryption schemes (PKESs). It requires that, given a public key and a ciphertext, anyone should be able to verify whether the ciphertext was actually generated using the public key. Also, it requires that, given a public key and a plaintext, no adversary should be able to generate a valid-looking ciphertext so that the verification passes, but nevertheless the plaintext can be recovered from the ciphertext without the corresponding secret key. We propose a general construction of such PKESs based on standard cryptographic primitives in the random oracle model.

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U2 - 10.1007/11908739_22

DO - 10.1007/11908739_22

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:33845276752

SN - 3540476997

SN - 9783540476993

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

SP - 308

EP - 321

BT - Advances in Information and Computer Security - First International Workshop on Security, IWSEC 2006, Proceedings

PB - Springer Verlag

T2 - 1st International Workshop on Security, IWSEC 2006

Y2 - 23 October 2006 through 24 October 2006

ER -