TY - GEN

T1 - Beyond quasi-linear utility

T2 - 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2008

AU - Sakurai, Yuko

AU - Saito, Yasumasa

AU - Iwasaki, Atsushi

AU - Yokoo, Makoto

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - We develop strategy/false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocols that can handle non-quasi-linear utilities. One almost universal assumption in auction theory literature is that each bidder has quasi-linear utility, except for some works on budget-constrained bidders. In particular, the celebrated VCG protocol is strongly believed to critically depend on the quasi-linear assumption and will break down if this assumption does not hold. We show that with a simple modification, the VCG can handle non-quasi-linear utilities by sacrificing efficiency to a certain extent. The basic idea of this modification is that tentative allocation and payments are determined assuming quasi-linear utilities, but each bidder can choose the actual number of units to obtain based on his non-quasi-linear utility. The modified VCG only uses the gross utility of each bidder. Requiring gross utilities only is an advantage since collecting the entire utility function can be costly. However, determining tentative allocation and payments without considering actual non-quasi-linear utilities can cause significant efficiency loss. Furthermore, the VCG is not robust against false-name-proof. Thus, we propose a new false-name-proof open ascending auction protocol in which each bidder declares his demand for a series of prices. This protocol can improve efficiency without collecting entire utility functions.

AB - We develop strategy/false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocols that can handle non-quasi-linear utilities. One almost universal assumption in auction theory literature is that each bidder has quasi-linear utility, except for some works on budget-constrained bidders. In particular, the celebrated VCG protocol is strongly believed to critically depend on the quasi-linear assumption and will break down if this assumption does not hold. We show that with a simple modification, the VCG can handle non-quasi-linear utilities by sacrificing efficiency to a certain extent. The basic idea of this modification is that tentative allocation and payments are determined assuming quasi-linear utilities, but each bidder can choose the actual number of units to obtain based on his non-quasi-linear utility. The modified VCG only uses the gross utility of each bidder. Requiring gross utilities only is an advantage since collecting the entire utility function can be costly. However, determining tentative allocation and payments without considering actual non-quasi-linear utilities can cause significant efficiency loss. Furthermore, the VCG is not robust against false-name-proof. Thus, we propose a new false-name-proof open ascending auction protocol in which each bidder declares his demand for a series of prices. This protocol can improve efficiency without collecting entire utility functions.

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M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:84899935798

SN - 9781605604701

T3 - Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

SP - 1569

EP - 1572

BT - 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2008

PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)

Y2 - 12 May 2008 through 16 May 2008

ER -