An error-tolerant variant of a short 2-secure fingerprint code and its security evaluation

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Citations (Scopus)


In recent research on collusion-secure fingerprint codes, some relaxation of the conventional security assumption (Marking Assumption) have been introduced from a viewpoint of reality in practical situations, and several fingerprint codes have been proposed under those assumptions. In this article, we consider such a relaxed assumption and give an extension of short 2-secure codes (under Marking Assumption) recently proposed by Nuida et al. (IEICE Trans. A, 2009) to our assumption. We perform theoretical and numerical evaluation of security and required code lengths. For example, to bound the error probability by 0.01% for 10,000 users, 162-bit, 220-bit and 329-bit lengths are sufficient even if each bit of the fingerprint codeword is either flipped (in addition to other collusion attacks) with probabilities 1%, 2.5% and 5%, respectively, or erased with probabilities 2%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAdvances in Information and Computer Security - 4th International Workshop on Security, IWSEC 2009, Proceedings
Number of pages18
Publication statusPublished - 2009
Externally publishedYes
Event4th International Workshop on Security, IWSEC 2009 - Toyama, Japan
Duration: Oct 28 2009Oct 30 2009

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume5824 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Other4th International Workshop on Security, IWSEC 2009

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)


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