A pseudo-polynomial algorithm for computing power indices in graph-restricted weighted voting games

Oskar Skibski, Tomasz P. Michalak, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Weighted voting games allow for studying the distribution of power between agents in situations of collective decision making. While the conventional version of these games assumes that any agent is always ready to cooperate with all others, recently, more involved models have been proposed, where cooperation is subject to restrictions. Following Myerson [1977], such restrictions are typically represented by a graph that expresses available communication links among agents. In this paper, we study the time complexity of computing two well-known power indices - the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index - in the graph-restricted weighted voting games. We show that both are #P-complete and propose a dedicated dynamic-programming algorithm that runs in pseudo-polynomial time for graphs with the bounded treewidth.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIJCAI 2015 - Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
EditorsMichael Wooldridge, Qiang Yang
PublisherInternational Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Pages631-637
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9781577357384
Publication statusPublished - 2015
Event24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2015 - Buenos Aires, Argentina
Duration: Jul 25 2015Jul 31 2015

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume2015-January
ISSN (Print)1045-0823

Other

Other24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2015
Country/TerritoryArgentina
CityBuenos Aires
Period7/25/157/31/15

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence

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