A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures

Naoyuki Kamiyama

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2013.07.006

A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures

Naoyuki Kamiyama

Division of Advanced Mathematics Technology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the problem of assigning agents having preferences to projects with capacities and lower quotas. For this problem, Monte and Tumennasan proposed a strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism, called the serial dictatorship with project closures. In this paper, we show that the serial dictatorship with project closures can be extended to a more general setting.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	559-561
Number of pages	3
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	41
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2013.07.006
Publication status	Published - 2013

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Software
Management Science and Operations Research
Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
Applied Mathematics

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10.1016/j.orl.2013.07.006

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JO - Operations Research Letters

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A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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