TY - JOUR
T1 - A comment on ‘the anti-paradox of cooperation
T2 - diversity may pay!’
AU - Li, Qian
N1 - Funding Information:
The author thanks Toshiyuki Fujita and the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful suggestions that have helped to improve this paper substantially.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - A recent study analytically investigates the stability of a public good coalition assuming unlimited types of players that differ in benefits and costs of providing public goods. They show that, if there is a positive covariance between benefit and cost parameters of coalition members, the size of a stable coalition cannot be larger than three. This comment further proves that if the above assumption is made to all players, coalition members always have high abatement benefits and costs.
AB - A recent study analytically investigates the stability of a public good coalition assuming unlimited types of players that differ in benefits and costs of providing public goods. They show that, if there is a positive covariance between benefit and cost parameters of coalition members, the size of a stable coalition cannot be larger than three. This comment further proves that if the above assumption is made to all players, coalition members always have high abatement benefits and costs.
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U2 - 10.1080/13504851.2020.1749759
DO - 10.1080/13504851.2020.1749759
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85082965332
SN - 1350-4851
VL - 28
SP - 246
EP - 248
JO - Applied Economics Letters
JF - Applied Economics Letters
IS - 3
ER -