A comment on "International Cooperation for Sale"

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


We reexamine the analysis of Barrett (2001), that explores the size of a self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Barrett stresses that the key feature to realize the self-enforcing agreement is asymmetries among countries, but we get the following results; certain condition that usually does not hold is required for the Barrett's solution, so it is necessary to reconsider the model settings.

Original languageEnglish
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2006

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)


Dive into the research topics of 'A comment on "International Cooperation for Sale"'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this